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     It is almost common sense for philosophers to limit their work and activity to reproduction of 
knowledge within the universe of so-called philosophical discourse and, possibly, through virtual 
dialogues with great philosophers in the past. Clinical Philosophers, on the other hand, don’t 
want to refer to philosophical predecessors as authorities who could justify Clinical Philosophical 
endeavors. Still, Socrates might be an exception. Socrates is well known for using just his own 
words to discuss with young men at the marketplace. He produced no books. Hegel could also help 
us think of what Clinical Philosophy might be. He preferred the term Wissenschaft, or Science, 
to the term philosophy, which, etymologically, limits itself to love, just love of knowledge. His 
Science is a pioneer of cybernetics or difference theories today in its level and form of penetrating 
abstraction. Excellent abstraction cannot be satisfied with bird’s-eye view looking down on 
everything. It needs going down there to access every wrinkle and corner of human life. We have to 
know how open philosophy is.    
     To know in broader sense is, I believe, possible without human intellect or articulated language. 
We will see how to consider knowing and philosophy more in the setting of epistemology based on 
natural history than from the perspective of history of philosophy.     
?????? ??? ???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
     Is knowledge a characteristic and action peculiar to homo sapiens? Let’s listen to the American 
anthropologist Gregory Bateson. Defining epistemology as quest for “how we can know anything,” 
Bateson continues to say, like an epistemological ecologist that he is, “in the pronoun we, I of 
course included the starfish and the redwood forest, the segmenting egg, and the Senate of the 
United States”1. While I quite agree to his idea that we ought not to confine the perceiving subject to 
us human beings, the ubiquitous structure of the subject beyond species which he tries to advocate 
?fails to convince me. Instead of the exemplified starfish, redwood forests and the U.S. Senate, I 
would rather summon dogs, the faculty meeting of the university I work for, and – my stomach. 
These are, among others, subjects or actors I have been watching or dealing with in everyday life. 
But why is my stomach a subject or actor? Because it recognizes and reacts to whatever comes 
in. You can of course disagree as to whether it should be called ‘to know’ or it should be called a 
subject or an actor. Yet, with Bateson, I share the idea that the concepts of knowing and subject 
need extension. 
     What then does a typical knowledge theory of philosophy look like? Many philosophers have 
been advocating awakening to the authentic knowledge. We can refer for instance to Plato’s well-
known ‘proverb of the cave’ (The Republic 514A-519A)2, the proverb which tries to indicate 
the realm of ideas, or of authentic beings, as lying somewhere outside, while degrading what 
are normally visible for us humans to mere shadows projected on the walls of the cave we are 
captivated in since our birth. For Plato, the world appearing through our sight is nothing but a 
cavernous prison for us. Bound hand and foot and also at the neck, we are barely capable to look 
straight ahead all our life. Various figures advancing in procession behind us, lit up by a fire 
burning in the center of the cave, cast their shadows on the front wall; the fire is a fake light source, 
compared with the sun, the true one. We are supposed to ‘see’ the shadowy forms as objects. How 
then does our transformation from this state take place? “In the course of nature”, Plato says, one 
of the creatures happens to get released from the bondage, “compelled” to turn about toward the 
entrance of the cave and then to leave it. He or she is thus to see the world of ideas lit up by the sun, 
or the Idea of the Good. This transformation means initially only pain for the person in question, 
something which degrades him or her in terms of the competences useful in the cave. “When he 
came out into the light, his eyes would be willed with its beams so that he would not be able to see 
even one of the things that we call real.”
     The first stage for the transformed person in the world of Ideas is therefore a kind of transitional 
one, which causes a time lag as to the recognition of what is real. Through “habituation,” getting 
accustomed to the transformed state step by step, Plato’s Philosopher undergoes a gradual birth.
     We shall take another of Plato’s narratives to take a glance at his way to discern the real from its 
imitation. It appears in the dialogue Theaetetus.3 
   Socrates indicates the issue as he says, “Begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is.”(151d) 
?To it, Theaetetus, the young man reputed to be clever, responds, giving a generally understandable 
remark that “knowledge is nothing else than perception (aisthesis).”(151e) Perception here, a term 
almost exchangeable for sensitivity, signifies an ability of immediate experience. Socrates, on 
hearing this naïve reply, made the young man uneasy by raising, as usual, various questions to him, 
suggesting in effect that perception does not necessarily represent the reality as it is, but can “deceit” 
us. The dazzled listener asks back, as if screaming, whether the proposition Socrates seems to 
suggest is believed by him in earnest or expressed with the sole aim of “testing” the listener (157c). 
Socrates’ response is the well-known concept of midwifery, in terms of knowledge reproduction: 
“I myself know nothing about such things, and claim none of them as mine, but am incapable of 
bearing them and am merely acting as a midwife to you, and for that reason am uttering incantations 
and giving you a taste (paratithemi) of each of the philosophical theories, until I may help to bring 
your own opinion to light.”(157c-d)
     To produce genuine or false knowledge is somebody else’s business. The mediator of knowledge 
him or herself does not, or cannot, give birth to knowledge but just demonstrates “each of the 
philosophical theories” of his acquaintance, has them tasted by the producer of knowledge and “bring 
your own opinion” provoked by it “to light”. In addition, the examination of whether the produced 
knowledge “productive” (gonimon) or “empty” (anemiaion) is, shall also belong to the task of the 
mediator. The false knowledge is compared to an empty or unfertilized egg, which will never be 
hatched and grow.
?????????????????????????????????????????
     We may ask ourselves if and how this form of meta-knowledge is to be justified – this mediating 
knowledge of a midwife which deals with another knowledge deriving from outside itself. If we 
are allowed to continue a little further the reproductive discourse, the midwife, rather than being 
“sterile,” (agonos) seems to secretly aim at becoming a certain surrogate mother. This no way 
trivial question shall be put aside here. 
     Let us return to the problem of authenticity of knowledge as Plato’s central motif. The 
“examination” by the midwife which tries to remove the “unfertilized egg,” despite the lingering 
attachment of its producer for it, is a sort of philosophical critique. The well-known awareness of 
?ignorance of Socrates can be considered to belong to such critique as well. Needless to say, this 
special “knowledge” is totally different from the one deemed significant and useful in the current 
knowledge-based society. Because, as the former maintains, only the knowledge which tries to 
approach the realm of “the Good and Beautiful” deserves the name, not the empirical one attained 
from the occupation or worldly wisdom. I am not so certain, however, if we should accept readily 
this highly reputed theorem, or if we should rather take note of its characteristic quest for the 
essence in the area alienated from lived contexture, although Socrates and also Plato retained clues 
to the lived experience in their own ways.  
     In history of philosophy as well as in history of science, we tend to summarize and judge what 
has happened only from the winners’ side. True, Socrates had every reason to argue down the self-
complacency of the craftsman, the politician or the poet - the famous scene of the awareness of 
ignorance. However, the Socratic way of leaping from the experienced knowledge to the form, to 
the “Good and Beautiful” itself seems to need at least justification, or - we may say – even ordeal 
of some critique. What kind of critique?  In contrast to the Socratic critique of empirical, everyday 
knowledge, it will have to be qualified as an insight of meta-level, one step higher than the Socratic 
but never turning back to the immediate affirmation of the empirical. Where does then the meta-
character of this meta-critique lie and how does it differ from Socrates’ immediate transcendence of 
immediate empirical knowledge?
     We could talk, on the other hand, about a non-philosophical alternative, about a dimension 
marked no more with philosophical authenticity. We could very well discuss the possible scheme 
of grasping implementation of knowledge from its externals, clarifying its social constellation and 
its role as one of social goods. Then we would deal with themes rather of sociology of knowledge 
than of philosophical theory of knowledge. The current term of knowledge-based society follows 
probably the latter approach more than the former. However, we should not forget to ask ourselves 
how knowledge can become “base” of our society and to what problems it gives rise.      
     I am supposed today to introduce to you the new philosophical concept and – I would dare say - 
movement of Clinical Philosophy in Japan, but let me refer here, in close connection to it, another 
innovative scheme of “communication-design”, initiated also by Kiyokazu Washida, the founder 
of Clinical Philosophy. Now, discussing the background of communication-design, Tadashi 
Kobayashi, one of the most eminent philosophers of science in Japan, points out the emergence in 
?the 20th century of “mistrust and social conflicts against experts accompanying unexpected events 
and accidents caused by societal management dependent upon huge amount of expert knowledge”, 
seeing its essence in “troubles taking place rather in the settings of circulation and consumption of 
knowledge than on those of production of knowledge”.4 Since philosophizing by philosophers is 
carried on nowhere else than in the midst of real world, they ought not be uninterested in reification 
of their own products, in which the products turn into sheer objects of “circulation and consumption 
of knowledge.” On the other hand, we can’t expect the task of philosophical knowledge to be 
fulfilled merely in focus on and analysis of social functions of knowledge. Clinical Philosophy, 
with its declaration of devoting itself to ongoing events and developments of each specific site in 
the society, aims precisely at going so far as interfering with scenes of “production of knowledge” 
so that good developments can be induced from there. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
???? ??????? ??????
     We are now questioning what kind of meta-character is required to the philosophical critique. 
In terms of authority and condition of epistemological critique, many people might consider it 
advisable to first give plenty of time to methodological examination. Even the terms “experience” 
and “critique” which appear in the title of my lecture – they might protest - should be preceded by 
endeavors for accurate definitions and prescriptions. Nevertheless, I don’t want to adopt the two-
staged method of - first- paving the way by checking instruments or media for critique so as – 
second -to be able  marching on to the main body of critique itself. This strategy is meant to follow 
Hegel’s example in his Phenomenology of Mind.
     The methodological skepsis of Descartes is an attempt to denounce the traditional form of 
knowledge radically and thoroughly in order to establish, once and for all, the “truth of absolute 
certainty.” General readers of history of Western philosophy are made to learn the Cartesian 
method as the revolutionary winner. It is, however, interesting to note some critics of Descartes: 
in the 20th century, for instance, a philosopher like Wittgenstein passed a stern judgment on this 
type of skepsis from the viewpoint of language use. Wittgenstein says in On Certainty that “He 
who tried to doubt everything would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting 
?itself presupposes certainty“5.I am tempted to call this a naturalism in terms of skepsis as a 
human conduct, might it diverge from Wittgenstein’s intention. Skepsis arises - as is “natural,” I 
would dare say - through contact with occurrences or people’s remarks, dissolves with time and 
disappears. Surely, people called philosophers will navigate the “nature” to some extent to construct 
logic. To implement skepsis methodically means application of skepsis “against nature”. Even 
philosophers, however, are not allowed to neglect rules of “games” carried out in natural languages. 
A game which professes itself as “putting everything in doubt” is after all a fake game with no 
prospect of completion.  
     What the philosopher Descartes – after throwing a short look at the “great book of the world” – 
discovered in solitary meditation, is critically reworked by Wittgenstein, a philosopher maybe as 
secluded as Descartes himself, in course of another solitary philosophyzing. Viewed in this light, 
aren’t we dismayed at idiosyncraticness of the knowledge inherited by philosophers?  Philosophers 
get absorbed in his thoughts. People on the street, on the other hand, may get concentrated in what 
he or she watches,  concentrated in exercising his or her ingenuity, or may hold his or her breath, 
but they usually don’t get absorbed in intentional and systematical thinking. There are some people 
who know – either by nature or from habit – how to get absorbed in thinking and who love this; then 
there are other people who train in thinking and who try to elaborate it as their won quality or even 
implement it methodically as their vocation or occupation. (It does not mean that thoughts could be 
manipulated at will. We have experienced that too much hard thinking leads often to headaches or 
stiffness in neck and shoulders; it is no joke but rather an organic relation quite significant from the 
viewpoint of “epistemology based on natural history” which I want to advocate.) The formers are 
probably to be called amateur philosophers and the latter expert philosophers.  Yet neither side can 
produce fruits of thinking out of nothing. Thinking is supported by natural language for one and by 
philosophical tradition for the other. 
     The term “epistemology based on natural history” I dared to introduce cautiously. My intention 
was not only to seize human knowledge or recognition independently of species related restrictions 
but also to regain flexibility of expressing ideas which had been fixed, before history of philosophy 
began, in cultural contexts. Let me put it this way: Thoughts including philosophical ones are, in 
current situations, disclosed, read, commented about, or cited mostly through printing. I would like 
to invite you to reconsider this predominance of print media or character expression. Let me explain 
?what I mean by starting with the difference between “remain” and “retain.” 
     Now could you tell me how natural objects remain where they are? Very simple. Fallen leaves 
on the mountain path stay there if not sent away by the wind. Staying there, they decay gradually 
and finally return to the soil. You might see some leaves already indistinguishable from the soil. 
Leaves settle down and remain for the time being. On the contrary, human knowledge wants to 
retain something. To retain is a human action. Retaining emotion, narrative or thought involves 
following aspects: (1) retain attentively one’s own thoughts, (2) retain attentively remarks of others, 
(3) retain one’s own remarks in thought just through speaking them out, and (4) retain thoughts and 
remarks by writing them down. Not until (4) can human thoughts clad in character expressions. In 
ancient Greece, Homer’s epics were passed down by voice transfer or storytelling by troubadours, 
or wandering poets. Socrates was one of the ancient Greeks who perhaps never “retained” his 
thoughts by writing down but let them spread among young people. No one of course can deny 
the important roles which have been played by the knowledge forms from (1) to (3). Without their 
precedence, the knowledge form (4) would have been impossible and the history of philosophy 
as well. When the knowledge form (4), in other words, the culture of printing and publishing 
prevailed, customes and rules which had had no place in the knowledge forms (1) to (3) became 
established as part of knowledge activities. Take, for instance, academic manners of literary citation 
sometimes too minute. If I look back correctly, people used to quote in books and articles in more 
careless, generous manner even 30 or 40 years ago. I suspect it to be a result of exaggerated and 
formalized desire of “retaining thoughts and remarks by writing them down.”
     In sum, human knowledge does not settle down in a >natural< way as fallen leaves on the 
mountain path do. From the viewpoint of epistemology based on natural history, forms and media 
of growing expressions tend to lose >natural< relationships with the surroundings gradually, 
getting more and more self-referential and autonomous. Even outside the academic authority, on 
blog websites for instance, mutual citations seem to develop a characteristically closed space. 
From another perspective, however, non-subjective, conventional knowledge can probably be said 
to have a sediment forming character. Let’s listen to the argumentation of habitus by the French 
sociologist P. Bourdieu. Habitus is a sediment of past experiences peculiar to a certain group or 
social class whish have settled down in individuals as scheme of perception, thinking or behavior. 
It might be open to question, however, if results of interactions between a group and an individual 
?in a historical process could be captured through a rather figurative expression of “sediment.” 
Anyway, Clinical Philosophers have been dealing with reconsideration of university as production 
base of knowledge and promotion of interactive and horizontal philosophical dialogues such as 
philosophical café or Neo Socratic Dialogue instead of one-way teaching by experts, among other 
activities and I suppose they will lead to >critique< of the fourth way of retaining knowledge and 
re-evaluation of the first three ways which might be more basic to us.    
?????? ???????????????????????????? ???
     It is not inappropriate to say that to observe matters theoretically means to apply a certain 
category, criterion or principle to objects, thus cutting off a part of the world according to such a 
frame. If so, to observe is a matter of framing. While general public observes things in everyday 
frames, i.e. based on common sense, philosophical >critique< is expected to criticize such frames. 
But don’t forget! This critique itself is a kind of framing. In this context, we could talk about 
>critique from below< or >bottom-up critique< in contrast to critique from above, i.e. based 
on a postulated principle. Let me allow myself to be rather provocative and say that Clinical 
Philosophers hope to follow a bottom-up procedure in opposition to, say, applied ethicists’ top-
down movement from the principle to the event. We want to orient ourselves firmly to a case or an 
event so as then to set out its verbalization or theorization. 
     To observe leads easily to self-legitimization of the observer. We have to be constantly on the 
watch for it. We have to control ourselves against the temptation to justify what is being observed 
or the observing posture through >observation of observation<, i.e. meta-observation. 
   Theoreticians like to talk about their stance first, then to act in accordance with that stance. This 
two-step strategy places limitations on both the action and the narrative about the stance. Instead, 
I would like to introduce “thinking in action” strategy into philosophy. If we will observe things 
changing the place where we stand, the observation necessarily gets affected by the environmental 
change. Checking this, we move on to a new observation. If we repeat this cycle, the “rolling stone” 
of knowledge will hardly “gather moss”. This proverb has, as you know, two opposite meanings. 
The original one says that those who are always traveling can’t take root anywhere, so can’t 
succeed; the newer version, on the other hand, claims that those who always want to move on to a 
??
new environment can improve themselves.   
     Those who are keen to accumulate visible, easy-to-understand results of knowledge – I would 
call such stance skeptically a >positive< one, a stance always keen to >posit< or make up something 
– will attempt covering as many specific objects as possible with fixed stance or frame so as to 
regulate all of them. As far as we humans are self-conscious, reflective animals, it is practically 
impossible for us to act in a totally day-to-day manner, keeping out every single stance or frame. 
Framing is inevitable and there is nothing wrong with it. My point is that we must realize tendency 
and >limit< of human understanding itself in accordance with the viewpoint of epistemology based 
on natural history. Why don’t we take that into account whenever we operate? In the first place I 
doubt if knowledge can truly be acquired by us as active subjects. For Francis Bacon knowledge 
is a power to make ourselves master of nature while obeying to it at the same time. Does it mean, 
however, man’s ability to set up the cognitive frame arbitrarily, outlining the world as he likes? 
Nietzsche, on the other hand, teases philosophers in Beyond Good and Evil saying, “Suppose truth 
is a woman, what then? Wouldn’t we have good reason to suspect that all philosophers, insofar 
as they were dogmatists, had a poor understanding of women, that the dreadful seriousness and 
the awkward pushiness with which they so far have habitually approached truth were clumsy 
and inappropriate ways to win over a woman?”6. Isn’t knowledge rather - I would like to suggest 
– something which comes to take hold of us, a kind of cognitive correlative in nature? That 
doesn’t mean man is only passive in cognition. Man tries to capture or recapture himself and his 
environment which has been captured by knowledge. This recursive attempt might be the eternal 
secret of theory of knowledge.     
     Or again we can listen to Gregory Bateson, who says, “we are most us governed by 
epistemologies that we know to be wrong”7. This trend, apparently self-contradictory from the 
intellectual point of view, derives from bodily need for the fallacy. It is by no means self-evident 
from the perspective of epistemology based on natural history that the living things called humans 
should speak and act in an intellectually consistent way. It is true that the human species has its 
peculiar cognitive framing, different, for example, from that of ticks as was examined by the 
theoretical biologist Jacob von Uexkuell; yet it is fixed and amplified by intellectualists. They talk 
and talk as if the human beings here – themselves – would never die. Why don’t they feed back the 
fact of mortality to the present situation? On the other hand, it is undeniable that people are not dead 
??
as far as they can talk. Intellectual activities, emerging at the culmination of life, are characterized 
by its incompatibility with death, rejection of death. Probably more challenging for knowledge 
is rather the question of how to face degradation and regression of intellect caused by declining 
physical and mental declination before the absolute closure of life – the problem of dementia. In the 
case of emerging blank or uncontrollable field because of decline in memory or judgment, I believe, 
you can consider leaving your problematic part in the hands of reliable people around you – we 
can call it >entrustment to others.<  In this context, we could conceive an alternative to, or even the 
opposite of the Heideggerian heroism. Instead of retrieving our Sein zum Tode, or Being-toward-
death, into existential decision, why not recognize in advance the frailty, the disjointedness in our 
very core, which only becomes obvious when we are senile? This recognition of weakness doesn’
t contradict our abovementioned proposal of thinking-in-action, because the activeness of the latter 
presupposes and expects, as I argued, >passiveness< or sensitivity of some kind. 
???????????????????? ?????? ??????????
     Now, I have become more and more aware of the importance of quoting a timely and well-
directed example or – I would rather say – case  when I really want to convince others, to achieve 
an aha! moment. The most precious case for me is my late father. I remember him suffering from 
late-stage stomach cancer and one day he could not spit out vomity material in his stomach. What 
did he do? He just tried to urinate, with success, then murmured, “Now I feel a bit better.” He 
substituted his vomiting with urination, or spitting out downward! The case I encountered shows us 
very clearly how flexible and extensive expressions of human needs or self-care can be; in addition, 
it illustrates admirably human will and ability for invention activated just in the face of adversity. 
The main character of this case is my father, which does not make the case a personal one for 
me. The case is probably understandable by anybody, because it is related to bodily disorder or 
needs, therefore has universality in terms of epistemology based on natural history. On the other 
hand, the case has the potential to provoke every philosopher in a broad sense of the word who is 
not satisfied with thinking or debating using clichés to rediscover and rekindle his or her original 
philosophical sensitivity and thinking. It can stimulate and inspire, hopefully, such people with 
“love of knowledge” (philo-sophia) to reopen philosophizing, but this time conjoint or synergetic 
??
philosophizing, enabling them to find a new context of philosophy.
     While urinating instead of vomiting may be called a compensatory behavior by psychologists, I 
don’t think this kind of paraphrase can represent abundance and complexity of this case.
   If modern scientific thinking has been decontextualizing in its mainstream, our case thinking can 
probably be characterized as recontextualizing. The reconstructed context, however, is no more the 
former specific one but a generalizable one, which goes beyond the closedness of the former. It can 
be amplified because it comes fully-fleshed from the lived world, not a skeletal theorem. I believe 
such a case can teach a lesson to anybody beyond difference of occupation or generation according 
to his or her position or interest.    
     I came across the case with my father not by thinking hard. This encounter was, however, no 
coincidence but took place in a certain context of my life. In other words, I had not been bestowed 
with the lucky encounter without my stance of “thinking in action” at that time. First: One of my 
greatest themes at that time was the philosophical trend of 1930s, and it was for me “poiesis of the 
borders” – you see, poiesis is the Greek word in close connection to invention. Second: I was in the 
middle of launching Clinical Philosophy as a new course at Osaka University and was discussing 
with my colleagues quite intensively what the essence of human needs or care is. Third and last, but 
not the least: I visited regularly the death bed of my father in my hometown and witnessed on one 
occasion the struggling invention by my desperate father. So, these were the elements which made 
the encounter with the case possible.  
     Then, I remember an event in the first year of the newly-created Clinical Philosophy course, in 
1998. It was a great warning to me not to take advantage of a case without paying close attention 
to its context – or not to use a case arbitrarily with self-serving interpretation of its context. Two 
main themes of our seminars used to be – and still are – medicine/nursing and education. And we 
were lucky enough to have two highly motivated nursing researchers as our PhD. candidates so that 
we could discuss ethical issues in medical or nursing settings not in a top-down manner but at least 
try to see them from the perspective of the lived world of experienced nurses. But one day one of 
the nurses or nursing researchers was very upset, indignant. She had offered one of her dear cases 
as material for discussion in the class but was disappointed as well as offended at her case being 
treated too lightly or rudely. She challenged us, teachers and students, to answer the question “What 
does a case mean in Clinical Philosophy?”   
??
     In hindsight I would say the keyword was “sense of discomfort or strangeness” for various 
stakeholders. The case was experienced by the nursing researcher herself as she had been a 
beginning nurse posted in a neurosurgical ward and met patient I. She described patient I as 
somebody whom nurses felt uncomfortable with. Her short report on him included, as ordinary 
nursing reports do, the patient’s personal data, his course after the hospitalization and the like, but 
such details made almost no sense to the students and the teachers unfamiliar with brain disease, so 
they didn’t know what to do with the report. Now, the nursing researcher who gave us the report 
admitted that her presentation of the case of patient I might have caused them “sense of discomfort” 
but added that this case had given the same sense of strangeness or misfit not only to her then 
colleague nurses but to herself during her presentation. While she suggested in this way multiple 
sense of discomfort, she urged each of the students and the teachers to contribute at least with a 
comment on the case. She intended no harassment by it, but rather an invitation for the members 
of Clinical Philosophy including herself to a joint examination of this case, she had as yet a novice 
nurse learned a lot to think of despite the discomfort. She introduced the case with no prospect of 
the result of the examination, turning down every unappreciative question or comment. The case 
report and the subsequent discussion on that day ended with the impression of nothing else than that 
sense of discomfort and opaqueness.
     This conflict, at least the emotional one, about how to access nursing cases, taught me a bitter 
lesson. I had been so naïve until then to expect that students and teachers who are not nurses should 
also be allowed to share the lived world of care through cases. In hindsight the nursing researcher 
did not try to reject our intervention, in the belief that those who were not professional nurses could 
never know what’s going on in nursing care. No, on the contrary, she continued to free herself from 
the world of nurses, from its tendency to closedness, that’s why she wanted to be admitted to the 
course of Clinical Philosophy, to join the new philosophical concept and movement which dared to 
get involved in problems of caring.    
     Usually, the moment nurses listen to a case, they grasp what it is all about, what’s the matter. 
This common, swift, and mostly correct understanding is hardly accessible to those who have no 
experience of nurses. Our nursing researcher, however, did not fail to point out that cases were 
more or less open even to laypersons just through the “sense of discomfort” if they were careful 
and intent listeners. The significance and the intention of her remark at that time is not yet fully-
??
understandable to me. It is also true that her case presentation earned her some critiques from other 
participants who were nursing experts themselves, because they were embarrassed to find that the 
presentation lacked a definite perspective and was still confined to unreflecting viewpoint of nurses. 
To me, however, this event provided a precious opportunity to realize that nursing experiences 
could include various, often contradicting viewpoints and contexts, that contact with the outside 
world including philosophers could enrich and enhance the thinking of nurses. And this was one of 
the discoveries which led me to the concept of a bottom-up “critique of experience” which tries to 
examine it right at the scene, paying respect to it. 
     And it is of course unethical or narrow-minded to discuss and interpret cases only for justification 
of a certain theory or hypothesis. I have the impression, however, that such a stance is not rarely to 
be seen with medical ethicists. I myself came to this awareness gradually through interactions and 
cooperation with people of various medical occupations, patients and their family members.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
     The second year of our Clinical Philosophy seminars was pretty eventful too. We invited one 
day a guest speaker who was doing a phenomenological research on care for patients with persistent 
vegetative state (PVS). During the discussion after her presentation, one of the PhD course students, 
who was non-medical and actually a Spinoza specialist, dared to speak out: “Well, suppose the 
nurse you interviewed was taking care of a precise machine, a robot!” He even went so far as to 
express his view of “automation of nursing care.” You can’t imagine how great a repulsion his 
statements envoked, mainly among the seminar participants of nursing occupation. In hindsight 
there were several problems. First, generally, it is not clear even to caregivers when they deal with 
so-called PVS patients if patients are conscious or not, if they are able to communicate or not. That 
is why nurses sometimes discuss among themselves or ask themselves, with much worry, who or 
what the >addressee< of their care is. Therefore the assumption of the patient as a machine, not 
a human, might have touched the most delicate part of nursing commitment, though obviously 
the patient is no machine, no robot!  Moreover, the remark of automation of nursing care was 
probably an additional damage to the feeling of uncertainty when attending a patient with severe 
communication trouble, though the remark meant no harm or mockery.
??
     I want to summarize most important points. We see here a difference of approach revealed, 
nursing approach of field-oriented thinking on the one hand and philosophical approach of 
theoretical thinking on the other, in the attempt to generalize the case beyond the specific context. 
The graduate student who talked about the automation of nursing care was a researcher interested 
among others in Spinoza’s antihumanism as well as social systems theory or autopoiesis, so he 
believed wholeheartedly that this approach of his must be useful also in verbalizing the nursing 
experience. The humanism typical to nurses, however, seems to have forbidden to flexibly listen to 
this rather exaggerated view.
     I must note, however, that nursing researchers don’t neglect critical comprehension of nursing 
care. Just like the reporter of the case of patient I, the phenomenological researcher who was 
dealing with care of PVS patients didn’t fail to come back to the field of nursing after they had 
accumulated generalizable critical insights to break the closure of nursing field. Moreover, there 
was even a nursing professional present at the discussion, who was radical enough to warn nurses 
against the presupposition that the client be understandable, or that the patient be capable of 
communication. According to him, people came to respect patients’ self-determination, a change 
surely desirable and partly encouraged by applied ethics, but he added that nurses now relied too 
much on what the patient >expressed<.  This is a sharp remark, specific and profound, showing 
clearly that societal institution and trend often affect the feeling or perception on the frontline 
itself. I am proud to confirm the quality of these presentations and remarks, which these members 
of Clinical Philosophy have already achieved as critique of experience, covering among others the 
topics of language and institution.   
     Here, I have to add a small side note. In the aforesaid dispute and confusion about the “robot” 
remark, I probably stood more on the side of the naïve nursing researcher than on the side of people 
critical to her. Critique, I know, is my subject here, but it must be distinguished from relativization 
of nursing practice by most philosophers or anthropologists. I doubt that the scholars are entitled 
to do that, just as Hegel in his Phenomenology of Mind sheds a skeptical light on the self-sufficient 
knowledge form called Verstand. Rather, I was making an effort, perhaps unconsciously, to 
understand the nursing practice or the nursing paradigm from within. This might have something 
to do with the principle of charity in rhetoric and hermeneutics, which requires that statements 
or utterances be interpreted in such a way that they become meaningful, coherent, rational. It is 
??
important at the same time to reconsider the intention of “robot” remark. The student who appeared 
to challenge the nursing side with it explained later that, actually, he had been very impressed by 
the presentation about the care of PVS patients, because it seemed to have shown the autopoietic 
capability of nursing practice, i.e. the capability, to connect nursing practice to however difficult 
a patient – whether it is PVS or not. The presentation put him in awe of the fundamental power 
of nursing, to know what to do even to incommunicable, in a way robot-like patients. And that 
made him consider the possibility of generalizing the autopoietic scheme so that philosophers, for 
example, might take advantage of it.    
     As you can see, this student is sufficiently sympathetic to nursing but observed and tried to 
interpret it from outside, while I was also sympathetic to nursing but tried to observe from inside. 
Exterior observation versus interior one. For the critique of experience, which we are aspiring to, it 
seems useful to alternate between exterior and interior observation.  
?????? ??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
     The critique of experience offers, therefore, by no means an external or panoramic view. Rather, 
as for nursing, it grows from inside nursing, from its frontline. The line of vision of people working 
on the spot gets duplicated: The one maintains the immediacy of the spot, while the other turns 
around to face the spot itself. It is no wonder that a sensitive, reflective nurse often feels a mixture 
of emotions to his or her occupation and expresses it in a complicated, sometimes contradictory 
way, in response to the complexity of nursing world. And the philosopher who observes the nurse 
will reflect and reproduce this duplication in his or her own way.   
     I’d like to remind you, in this respect, of Hegel’s methodology dominating his Phenomenology 
of Mind. This unique work, initially conceived as Science of Experience of Consciousness, describes 
typical forms of consciousness as it climbs up the ladder of developing human mind. Starting with 
the poorest form “sensuous certainty,” which perceives only “now and here”, and ending with the 
most abundant and universal stage “absolute knowledge,” the series of consciousness forms might 
well be seen as Hegelian set of cases to represent the human history and culture. Hegel does not 
judge nor sublate these forms from above. The alleged science of experience, in confrontation 
with philosophies of Kant and the others, marks a true, immanent critique. The “criterion” of 
??
critique is not given beforehand. The “we,” the describer throughout the “science of experience 
of consciousness” just observe without any intervention what kind of phenomenon or proposition 
each consciousness form firmly believes to be true and real. And in that describing gaze the alleged 
truth soon splits itself up and transforms. Just in the false belief of the consciousness itself has 
the criterion lurked, a power which drives the consciousness out of insufficient truth, drives the 
“experience” into enhanced openness or the universal8. Isn’t this close to what I called sometime 
ago duplication of the line of vision?
     On the other hand, it is obvious how different my proposal of critique of experience is from 
Hegel’s conception. It doesn’t share Hegel’s claim for scientific absoluteness at all. Nor does it 
want to set up, say nursing care, as a consciousness form, let alone assume that another, more 
universal consciousness form emerges after the form of nursing care is sublated. We have nothing 
like nursing care in general, we have only each specific care carried out by respective nurses, to 
respective clients, in respective contexts. For a critique with wide range, however, we need also 
to keep our proper distance from the context, not sticking to it. Yet the problem is how we can 
keep that “proper distance,” how we can acquire the duplication of the line of vision, orienting 
ourselves firmly toward diversity and individuality of substantial experience, without formalized 
talk about experience in general. Where can we feel a sign of possible recontextualization aspiring 
for cooperation and universality, avoiding both the top-down destruction of each context and the 
adherence to some allegedly unique and irreplaceable context? The answer must be found when we 
manage to hear softly both the voice from within and the one from without. 
     In relation to my concept of epistemology based on natural history, it is interesting to find 
Gregory Bateson distinguishing the analogue from the digital communication. “I love you,” for 
instance, is a digital communication using articulate language. “If you say to a girl, “I love you,” 
she is likely to pay more attention to the accompanying kinestics [magnitude of the gesture, the 
tension of the muscle, etc.] and paralinguistics[shifts in tempo of speech, overtones of voice, etc.] 
than to the words themselves.”9 
     Not only in the case of confession of love, but in the case of every experience and critique of 
experience, it will probably be crucial to sense and respond to analogue, bodily communication 
operating in him/herself and people on the frontline. And for that, it is advisable to keep 
comfortable rhythm, keep yourself flexible and relaxed. Yes, philosophers, especially Western 
??
philosophers have been operating mainly with ideas and concepts, but why be loyal to such a digital 
tradition? Humans, even the most rational of them, are not always motivated by ideas and concepts. 
We have only to include these factors in our “epistemology based on natural history”, with a view 
to the fact that they represent important media of human activities. I might very well advocate a 
critique of experience which avoids putting too much weight in intellect. 
     What does it mean then to catch a voice from outside? The frontline is never completely 
closed. It has interactions with various approaches from outside world including society, politics, 
economics, culture. The frontline learns often and accepts a lot from historical formations such 
as knowledge and information in books. Let me give you just one example. Some researchers of 
philosophy and ethics have occasion to examine medical studies aimed at human beings. They can 
criticize study designs not respectful enough to subjects’ rights, requesting its modification.
????????? ????????????????????????????
     I would like to close with the question how exactly philosophers and ethicists can conduct 
critique. As they are considered experts on ethics, they are often asked to sit on a medical ethics 
committee. What’s the problem with it? In order to discuss ethics in the field of medical research, it 
is at least insufficient and can even become irrelevant to work with formal universal knowledge of 
the ethical discipline. The discussion and argumentation needs substantial, or material knowledge 
of the concerned medical research for backing up: knowledge of pharmacological effect of a new 
drug, for instance. For that kind of knowledge, however, ethicists must rely on other committee 
members who are medical experts. Yes, it’s not impossible to accumulate material knowledge 
through deliberations of the committee or by self-learning to match the medical experts to some 
extent. Then the ethicists can contribute to deliberation and decision of the ethics committee, 
which, based on such knowledge, is now a critique of material significance. It is however no more 
a critical assessment issued from the perspective of a self-contented philosopher or an ethicist, but a 
critique shared and sharable with outside – in this case: medical - experts as the result of deepened 
exchange with them, as the result of self-critique and overcoming of the old confined discipline.
     Therefore we must say that critique of experience from the viewpoint of Clinical Philosophy 
belongs basically to a collective communication, not a dictum written down in a solitary study. We 
??
can proceed to point out how important, realistic and prospective it is today that philosophers and 
ethicists work as experts of mediation or coordination to facilitate and organize discussion of many 
people concerned with contradicting interests and views. This knowledge of mediation will have to 
monitor itself and its surroundings constantly from the viewpoint of epistemology based on natural 
history, lest it lose nurture and stimulation from specific contexts, because who wants his or her 
knowledge to remain “empty”?  
?????
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